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INTRODUCTION

In recent decades, family as a social entity has metamorphosed
into various forms, expanding the boundaries of its definition beyond
those that existed traditionally. While it is critical for the law to respond to societal changes, the law-especially family law, intertwined
as it is with local discretion and jurisdictional custom-often does so
in a tentative and asymmetrical fashion among the states. Certainly,
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
Katie A. Fougeron, B.S. 2001, University of Nebraska-Kearney; J.D. expected
May 2005, University of Nebraska College of Law (NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW, Executive Editor, 2004). Thank you to Ken, Sherry, and Abbie Fougeron for their
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state courts must give full faith and credit to judicial rulings of other
states.1 Beyond this constitutional mandate, however, state courts exercise the authority to interpret their own state laws. Furthermore,
as courts of equity, state courts have long held authority over the persons and property of the state's children under their "general duty as
parens patriae to protect persons who have no other rightful protector."2 It is within thesebroad parameters that state courts function to
ensure the fair and equitable disposition of cases involving families
and children.
3
The Nebraska Supreme Court's opinion in Russell v. Bridgens illustrates Nebraska's venture into the relatively uncharted territory of
the legal relationships between same-sex parents and their children.
Russell involved the appeal of a Nebraska lower court's ruling that a
coparent adoption completed in Pennsylvania by a same-sex couple
was invalid under Pennsylvania law.4 Russell appealed the district
court's ruling that granted summary judgment to Bridgens, Russell's
former partner. 5 The lower court held that because the Pennsylvania
court 6 did not have jurisdiction to grant a Pennsylvania coparent
adoption, 7 the adoption decree was invalid, and therefore, Russell
could not prevail on a petition to establish custody and support. The
1. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
2. Ins. Co. v. Bangs, 103 U.S. 435 (1880). The Supreme Court stated:
The jurisdiction possessed by the English courts of chancery from this
supposed delegation of the authority of the crown as parens patriae is
more frequently exercised in this country by the courts of the States
than by the courts of the United States. It is the State and not the Federal government . . . which stands, with reference to the persons and
property of infants, in the situation of parenspatriae.
Id. at 438. See also In re Interest of M.B. & A.B., 239 Neb. 1028, 1030, 480
N.W.2d 160, 161 (1992) (citing "the power every sovereignty possesses as parens
patriae to every child within its borders to determine the status and custody that
will best meet the child's needs and wants" in the context of juvenile court jurisdiction); James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children's Existing Rights in State Decision Making About their Relationships, 11 Wm. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 845,
854-56 (2003) (discussing a state's responsibility to determine with whom children will have and maintain legal relationships).
3. 264 Neb. 217, 647 N.W.2d 56 (2002).
4. Id. at 219, 647 N.W.2d at 58.
5. The District Court of Douglas County issued its final order in 2001. Id. at 219,
647 N.W.2d at 58.
6. The Decree of Adoption was issued by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia
County, Family Court Division, Adoption Branch in 1997. Brief of Appellant at
12, Russell (No. A-01-965).
7. A coparent or second-parent adoption is one in which an unmarried partner of the
legal parent is allowed to adopt the child without terminating the legal parent's
rights. See Tiffany L. Palmer, Am. Bar Ass'n, Family Matters: EstablishingLegal ParentalRights for Same Sex Parents and Their Children, 30 HuM. RTs. 9, 9
(Summer 2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/summerO3/paternal.
html.
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Supreme Court of Nebraska reversed and remanded.8 While the majority opinion reversed the district court's decision based on a procedural finding,9 the concurring opinion focused on additional assignments
of error made by the appellant and, in particular, discussed the doctrine of in loco parentis,1o which allows a person to "'stand[] in the
shoes' of the natural parent and assume[] the same rights and duties
as such."11 The concurring opinion in Russell provides some guidance
to Nebraska courts as to the equitable doctrines that may be available
under Nebraska law to substantiate rights, such as custody, visitation, and support, for individuals who have served as parents to children, 12 but who may not have secured, or been able to secure, a legal
relationship with them through adoption.13
This Note will explore the law of second-parent adoption as it has
developed among the states, the facts and opinions of Russell, and the
doctrine of in loco parentis as applied by Nebraska and other state
courts. In doing so, this Note will argue that, in light of the willingness of Russell's concurring judges to apply the doctrine of in loco
parentis to custody disputes between separated same-sex partners,
courts in Nebraska should follow the concurring judges' lead and not
hesitate to apply the doctrine as needed on a case-by-case basis in order to respond to the current needs of families and to provide for the
best interests of children.14
8.
9.
10.
11.

Russell, 264 Neb. at 222, 647 N.W.2d at 60.
Id.
Id. at 229-31, 647 N.W.2d at 65-66 (Gerrard, J., concurring).
Felicia Meyers, Gay Custody and Adoption: An Unequal Application of the Law,
14 WHITTIER L. REV. 839, 854 (1993) (citing Elizabeth A. Delaney, Comment,
Statutory Protection of the Other Mother: Legally Recognizing the Relationship
Between the NonbiologicalLesbian Parent and Her Child, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 177,
194 (1991)).
12. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03 cmt. b at 128 (2000) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES] (citing equitable parent, equitable adoption, in loco parentis, and equitable estoppel as examples of
"equitable doctrines [that] have been used by some courts to permit the extension
of parental rights to an individual who otherwise would not qualify").
13. See In re Adoption of Luke, 263 Neb. 365, 371, 640 N.W.2d 374, 379 (2002) (per
curiam). The Nebraska Supreme Court held that a coparent or second-parent
adoption, such as the one Russell and Bridgens intended to achieve in Pennsylvania, is not possible under Nebraska's adoption statutes.
14. One pair of researchers argue that "[b]est interests of children are always at the
heart of any analytical framework in an action where custody cr visitation are at
issue." Angela Dunne Tiritilli & Susan Ann Koenig, Essay: Advocacy for Nebraska Children with Gay and Lesbian Parents:A Call for the Best Interests of the
Child to Be Paramountin the Case of Non-Biological, Non-Adoptive Parents, 36
CREIGHTON L. REV. 3, 17-18 (2002) (arguing that "the parental preference doctrine should be abolished in favor of the best interests of the child" in custody
determinations involving "non-biological, non-adoptive parents"). See also NEB.
REV. STAT. § 43-109(1) (Reissue 1998) ("If, upon the hearing, the court finds that
such adoption is for the best interests of such minor child ...

, a decree of adop-
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II. BACKGROUND
A.

Second-Parent Adoption Among the States

Russell v. Bridgens provides an example of the how the Supreme
Court of Nebraska has operated within a conceptual framework already established in the law in attempting to address the needs of
same-sex couples and their children.' 5 The issues involved in Russell
are those that many courts in recent years have faced in response to
the increasing number of same-sex couples who wish to parent children. 1 6 Those couples that decide to have families often face legal difficulties in providing health insurance and Social Security benefit
coverage for their children, in securing inheritance rights, and in establishing the authority to consent for medical care.1 7 Furthermore,
in the event that such couples separate, they are forced to confront
widely diverging state laws in the areas of custody, visitation, and
child support-the overlapping of which often produces results that
are unjust for the parties and that fail to provide for the best interests
of the children involved.' 8 In some jurisdictions, one option available
to same-sex couples who wish to avoid such problems by establishing a
legal parent-child relationship with their child is coparent adoption,
or as it is more commonly termed, second-parent adoption. Like stepparent adoption, 19 second-parent adoption allows an individual to
adopt her or his partner's biological or adopted child without first ter20
minating the partner's legal parental status.
tion shall be entered."); Luke, 263 Neb. at 387, 640 N.W.2d at 389-90 (Gerrard,
J., dissenting) (stating that a consideration of the best interests of children is
"what this court has previously held to be the primary interpretive principle applicable to the adoption statutes").
15. For an introduction to the diverse legal issues that GLBT individuals face in Nebraska and elsewhere, see Amy Miller, Professionalism and Sexual Orientation,
NEB. LAW., Jan. 2004, at 7.
16.

NAT'L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, ADOPTION BY LESBIAN, GAY AND BISEXUAL PAR-

ENT FAMILIES 1 (Jan. 2004) (citation omitted), available at http://
www.nclrights.org/publications/pubs/adptn02O4.pdf. See also Patricia M. Logue,
The Rights of Lesbian and Gay Parentsand Their Children, 18 J. AM. AcAD. MATRIM. LAW. 95, 108 (2002) (discussing a "trend" in the last twenty years in which
same-sex partners are increasingly able to effect joint and second-parent
adoptions).
17. See Palmer, supra note 7, at 9.
18. Id.
19. Michael T. Morley et al., Developments in Law and Policy: Emerging Issues in
Family Law, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 169, 200 (2003).
20.

NAT'L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, SECOND PARENT ADOPTIONS: A SNAPSHOT OF CUR-

RENT LAW 1 (Aug. 2003), available at http://www.nclrights.org/publications/pubs/
2pa0803.pdf.
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21
Only a few months before its decision in Russell, the Nebraska
22
found that an
and
Luke
of
Supreme Court decided In re Adoption
rights
parental
possessing
already
individual
an
of
partner
unmarried
over a child could not adopt that child without the parent that pos23
Specifically,
sesses parental rights first relinquishing those rights.
the Court stated that "with the exception of the stepparent adoption,
the parent or parents possessing existing parental rights must relinquish the child before 'any minor child may be adopted by any adult
person or persons."' 24 Other states have wrestled with the same question: do the state's adoption statutes allow second-parent adoption by
persons other than stepparents? The import of a given state's answer
is substantial, since the resolution of this issue inevitably establishes
the foundation for defining the legal relationships between same-sex
couples and their children in that state.
In response to the above question, most state courts that have addressed the issue interpret their own adoption statutes liberally to allow same-sex couples to adopt their partner's biological or adoptive
children. 25 These courts often rely on their broad discretion in providing for the best interests of the child.26 However, a few state courts,

21. The decision in In re Adoption of Luke was filed on March 8, 2002; the decision in
Russell v. Bridgens was filed on June 28 of the same year.
22. In re Adoption of Luke, 263 Neb. 365, 640 N.W.2d 374 (2002) (per curiam).
23. Id. at 377, 640 N.W.2d at 383.
24. Id. at 371, 640 N.W.2d at 379 (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-101(1) (Reissue 1998
& Cum. Supp. 2002)). The Court in Luke interpreted the Nebraska adoption statutes, found at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-101 to -115 (Reissue 1998 & Cum. Supp.
2002), to require that, with the exception of stepparent adoption, any parent possessing parental rights must first relinquish his or her child before that child is
eligible for adoption. Luke, 263 Neb. at 371, 640 N.W.2d at 379.
25. See, e.g., Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554 (Cal. 2003) (stating that the
California statutes authorize an "independent adoption" in which the legal parent's rights are not terminated and that such statutes are constitutional), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 1220 (2004); In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995); Adoption of
Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993); In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995); In
re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1201-02 (Pa. 2002) (holding that parents
should be allowed to show good cause as to why their same-sex partners should
be allowed to adopt their children without terminating their own parental
rights); see also Morley et al., supra note 19, at 201-02 & nn.243-49 (observing
that courts in Ohio, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Connecticut, Vermont, Illinois, and
New Jersey, among others, have interpreted their state statutes to provide either
custodial or adoptive rights to same-sex partners).
26. See, e.g., In re Hart, 806 A.2d 1179, 1182 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2001) (holding that a
same-sex partner of the children's legal parent may adopt them without affecting
that parent's legal rights when the adoption is in the children's best interests); In
re Adoption of M.M.G.C., 785 N.E.2d 267 (Ind.Ct. App. 2003) (authorizing second-parent adoption through the application of the best interest of the child standard); see also Am. BAR AS'N, REPORT (Summer 2003) (stating that the best
interests of the child is the purpose behind the Association's adoption of a resolution that supports joint and second-parent adoptions), available at http:l!
www.abanet.org/leadership/2003/journall12.pdf.
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like Nebraska's, have construed their state's adoption statutes narrowly and found that they preclude the possibility of second-parent
adoption by any person other than stepparents. 27 Moreover, because
same-sex couples have so far been precluded from marrying in Nebraska, 28 they are also unable to invoke the stepparent exception.
Currently, only a few states have chosen to enact legislation to either
explicitly allow or preclude second-parent adoptions by same-sex
29
couples.
Although the Nebraska Supreme Court denied the possibility of effecting second-parent adoptions in Luke, many questions remain. One
such question is whether a Nebraska court would give full faith and
credit to second-parent adoptions completed in sister states. 30 Russell
indicates that the answer is yes, but leaves open the possibility that a
litigant might collaterally attack a foreign adoption decree for lack of
jurisdiction.31 Another important question remaining after both Luke
27. See Luke, 263 Neb. at 376, 640 N.W.2d at 382-83; see also In re T.K.J., 931 P.2d
488, 492 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996); In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 683 n.8 (Wis.
1994). See also Morley et al., supra note 19, at 200 & n.238 (noting that some
states reject second-parent adoptions, because often "the law facilitates adoption
by married stepparents, but not gay partners.").
28. See Defense of Marriage Amendment ("DOMA"), NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29 (adopted
2000). The recent amendment to the Nebraska Constitution states: "Only marriage between a man and a woman shall be valid or recognized in Nebraska. The
uniting of two persons of the same sex in a civil union, domestic partnership, or
other similar same-sex relationship shall not be valid or recognized in Nebraska."
Id.
29. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-724(a)(3) (West Supp. 2002) ("[Alny parent of a
minor child may agree in writing with one other person who shares parental responsibility for the child with such parent that the other person shall adopt or
join in the adoption of the child."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, §1-102(b) (Supp. 2002)
("If a family unit consists of a parent and the parent's partner, and adoption is in
the best interest of the child, the partner of a parent may adopt a child of the
parent. Termination of the parent's parental rights is unnecessary in an adoption under this subsection."). But see FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2002) ("No person
eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual.");
MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(2) (2000) ("Adoption by couples of the same gender is
prohibited.").
30. As of the time of publication of this Note, very few courts have addressed this
question. See, e.g., Press Release, Nat'l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights, Lesbian Attempts to Use Anti-Gay Law to Invalidate Second-Parent Adoption (Apr. 24,
2000) (calling a biological mother's attempt to invalidate her former partner's second-parent adoption "unprecedented"), available at http://www.nclrights.org/releases/nocar.htm. See also Barbara J. Cox, Adoptions by Lesbian and Gay
Parents Must Be Recognized by Sister States Under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause Despite Anti-Marriage Statutes that Discriminate Against Same-Sex
Couples, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 751, 779-85 (2003) (discussing only three examples in
which courts and a state legislature have concluded that states must extend full
faith and credit to second-parent adoptions granted in other states).
31. Russell v. Bridgens, 264 Neb. 217, 220, 647 N.W.2d 56, 59 (2002). While the
majority opinion stated as a general matter that "a foreign judgment can be collaterally attacked by evidence that the rendering court was without jurisdiction
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and Russell is what equitable remedies exist in Nebraska that might
secure rights such as custody and visitation for individuals who have
in fact parented a child but who are unable to establish a legal relationship through adoption? The concurring opinion in Russell,
through its discussion of the doctrine of in loco parentis,provides some
guidance in addressing this issue.
B.

Facts and Opinions in Russell v. Bridgens

At the time the Pennsylvania coparent adoption took place, Russell
and Bridgens were a same-sex couple who lived together and wanted
to adopt a child.3 2 In 1996, Bridgens adopted Joseph Noble Bridgens
in a court in Pennsylvania, the state where Joseph was born. Then in
1997, both Bridgens and Russell adopted Joseph through a "co-parent
33
adoption" in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.
The family lived together in Germany until the couple separated in
1999, when Russell and Joseph moved back to the United States. In
2000, Russell filed a petition to establish custody and support for Jo3
seph in the District Court of Douglas County, Nebraska. 4 In rethat
alleging
sponse, Bridgens filed a motion for summary judgment,
35
Accepting
invalid.
was
adoption
coparent
the Pennsylvania
Bridgens' argument that the Pennsylvania adoption could be collaterally attacked in Nebraska for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under
Pennsylvania law, the district court granted Bridgens' motion and dismissed Russell's complaint. 36 In reaching its decision, the district
court did not employ an analysis of the child's best interests; nor did it
address the pressing issues of custody or visitation of Joseph by Rus38
Further,
sell, 37 who had been his primary caregiver for five years.
Pennthe
besides
basis
other
any
consider
to
failed
court
the district
sylvania adoption39 under which Russell might have such custody or
visitation rights.
On appeal, Russell assigned five errors, the first of which was addressed by the majority opinion: the district court erred in failing to
apply the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitu-

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

over the parties or the subject matter," id., the concurring opinion argued that
Pennsylvania law would not permit such a collateral attack on the facts of Russell. Id. at 223-26, 647 N.W.2d at 61-63.
Brief of Appellant at 9, Russell (No. A-01-965).
Brief of Appellee at 2, Russell (No. A-01-965).
Russell, 264 Neb. at 219, 647 N.W.2d at 58.
Id.
Id. at 219, 647 N.W.2d at 58-59.
Id. at 222-23, 647 N.W.2d at 61 (Gerrard, J., concurring).
Brief of Appellant at 9, Russell (No. A-01-965).
Russell, 264 Neb. at 229, 647 N.W.2d at 65 (Gerrard, J., concurring) (arguing that
"the district court's ... assumption that the adoption issue was dispositive of the
action" was erroneous).
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tion. 40 Basing its reversal on a narrow procedural finding, the majority held that the record failed to demonstrate, as a matter of law, that
the 1997 Pennsylvania coparent adoption decree was not entitled to
full faith and credit under the United States Constitution, primarily
because the record only included the adoption decree and not the petition for adoption.41 Consequently, Bridgens failed to meet the burden
required for summary judgment, an error requiring reversal and
42
remand.
Because reversal was required under this relatively narrow procedural holding, the majority of the Court did not consider Russell's remaining assignments of error, which involved the following questions:
whether res judicata bars an attack on an adoption decree by a sister
state; whether Russell's affidavit detailing her role as the primary
caregiver should have been admitted into evidence; whether equitable
estoppel bars the motion for summary judgment; whether Russell had
attained status to petition for custody under the doctrine of in loco
parentis;and whether the child's best interests should have been considered.43 However, the concurring opinion by Justice Gerrard, in
which Justice Wright joined, did address some of these additional assignments of error.
Regarding the issue of whether Nebraska must give full faith and
credit to a Pennsylvania coparent adoption, the concurring opinion
stated that the validity of a coparent adoption under Pennsylvania
law is not an issue of subject matter jurisdiction that can be subject to
later collateral attack.44 As to the question of resjudicata,the concurring opinion stated that even if Bridgens could have timely appealed
the Pennsylvania court's finding that it had subject matter jurisdiction, she could not later collaterally attack such a finding in a different
state, since "jurisdictional determinations made in a prior proceeding
are res judicata in a subsequent proceeding involving the same
litigants."45
In discussing the doctrine of in loco parentis, the concurring judges
emphasized the magnitude of its impact on Russell's ability to petition
for custody and support: "Even if the Pennsylvania adoption decree is
not entitled to full faith and credit, Russell is entitled to proceed to
trial standing in loco parentis."4 6 In other words, since the consideration of in loco parentis is an equitable one, entirely distinct from any
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 219-20, 647 N.W.2d at 59.
Id. at 221-22, 647 N.W.2d at 60.
Id. at 222, 647 N.W.2d at 60.
Id. at 219, 647 N.W.2d at 59.
Id. at 226, 647 N.W.2d at 63.
Id. at 226-27, 647 N.W.2d at 63 (stating that "an unappealed final determination
of [a court's] subject matter jurisdiction-albeit erroneous-is res judicata as to
those litigants").
46. Id. at 231, 647 N.W.2d at 66.
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attempted adoption or other actions at law in sister states, a finding
that Russell is a parent under the doctrine of in loco parentis would
have been sufficient to defeat Bridgens' motion for summary judgment
on its own. The concurring opinion reveals the power of this equitable
argument for litigants in Russell's position: "[A party] can maintain
her petition [to establish custody and support] regardless of whether
the [foreign state's] adoption decree is given full faith and credit, if
[such party] can demonstrate an in loco parentis relationship with the
minor child."47
Finally, the concurring opinion stressed its concern that "the record reflects that the minor child's best interests have needlessly re48
The
mained unaddressed while these proceedings continue on."
opinion advised the district court to make "interim arrangements...
for the minor child's visitation with whichever party does not have
such visitation "consistent with the
temporary custody" and to 4order
9
child."
the
of
interests
best
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Other States' Application of Equitable Doctrines to
Issues Involving Same-Sex Families

The concurring opinion in Russell makes it clear that when the legal adoptive relationship between a parent and child is in question,
50
the availability of equitable doctrines, such as in loco parentis, for
individuals in Russell's position is vital to providing an enforceable
51
Moreover, equitable remebasis for such relationships to continue.
couples living in
to
same-sex
available
dies may be the only ones
states with laws similar to those of Nebraska, under which same-sex
partners can neither marry nor effect second-parent adoptions.
For example, two lesbian partners who decide that one of them will
give birth to a child through artificial insemination, plan to raise the
child together, do so for several years, and later end their relationship,
will find themselves in very different legal positions with respect to
Id. at 230, 647 N.W.2d at 66.
Id. at 222, 647 N.W.2d at 61.
Id. at 227, 647 N.W.2d at 66.
Other equitable doctrines include de facto (or psychological) parenthood, which
"connotes a parent-child relationship that does not conform to statutory definitions of parenthood, but exists in fact." Meyers, supra note 11, at 854. See also
PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, §2.03(1)(c), at 118 (defining "de facto parent"); Morley
et al., supra note 19, at 203-05 (discussing various state courts' findings of "de
facto parenthood").
51. Russell, 264 Neb. at 229, 647 N.W.2d at 65 ("Discussion of this issue is essential
because under the in loco parentis doctrine, as established by both Nebraska and
Pennsylvania law, Russell can maintain her petition for custody even if the Pennsylvania adoption decree is not entitled to full faith and credit.").

47.
48.
49.
50.
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their child.52 One partner, as the child's biological parent, will be presumed to have parental rights over the child. The other, having been
precluded from establishing a legal adoptive relationship with the
child under state adoption law, will be left without legal recourse to
maintain her relationship with the child.53 In situations such as
these, it is imperative for courts to consider equitable doctrines such
as in loco parentis in order to reach a result that recognizes an existing parent-child relationship and that is also in the child's best
interests.
In general, based on their equitable power to consider the best interests of the child, state courts have readily awarded visitation to
persons other than legal parents who have played a significant role in
a child's life, including grandparents, other relatives, and nonrelatives. 54 Furthermore, courts in many states are moving away from
their initial reluctance to grant parent-like rights to more than one
father or mother, toward a willingness to allow same-sex partners to
petition for custody, visitation, or both.55
52. See Diana Lauretta, Comment, Protecting the Child's Best Interest: Defending
Second-ParentAdoptions Granted Prior to the 2002 Enactment of CaliforniaAssembly Bill 25, 33 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 173, 173 (Spring 2003).
53. See Logue, supra note 16, at 115 (describing a similar situation as a "[t]ypical
case" in which "the parent-child relationships of nonbiological de facto parents
[are] cast into legal limbo").
54. See, e.g., Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291, 301 (Me. 2000) (upholding constitutionality of Maine's grandparent visitation statute, particularly for a grandparent
who has "functioned as a parent to the child"); Youmans v. Ramos, 711 N.E.2d
165 (Mass. 1999) (affirming an aunt's visitation privileges when the aunt raised
her niece for most of her life); Rosse v. Rosse, 244 Neb. 967, 973, 510 N.W.2d 73,
78 (1994) (affirming a grandparent visitation award in a dissolution proceeding
where "clear and convincing evidence [existed] that there is, or has been, a significant beneficial relationship between the grandparent and the child, that it is in
the best interests of the child that such relationship continue, and that such visitation will not adversely interfere with the parent-child relationship"); In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995) (ruling that the court had power to
award visitation to a person who acted as an equal coparent with the biological
parent pursuant to a best-interest determination). But see Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion) (finding that a broad Washington statute
which permitted a visitation award to "[a]ny person" as applied to the facts of the
case violates the due process rights of those biological parents).
55. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 2.18, at 397-98; Morley et al., supra note 19, at
205. Notably, state custody and visitation statutes also reflect the significance of
equitable considerations for such matters involving families. See, e.g., HAw. REV.
STAT. § 571-46(2) (2000) (awarding custody to "[any person who has had de facto
custody of the child in a stable and wholesome home" when such an award is in
the best interest of the child); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.27(sec.7)(1)(c) (2001)
(favoring individuals who demonstrate their role as "de facto parents" in custody
disputes); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24(1)(e) (2001) (favoring persons in custody
disputes when the child has lived with them for a substantial period of time in a
"wholesome and stable environment").
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Certainly, some state courts that have confronted situations similar to the one described above have failed to consider equitable doctrines such as in loco parentisin determining the rights of the parties.
For example, a court in Michigan refused to grant custody to a nonlegal parent after the death of her same-sex partner, the biological parent.5 6 In addition, courts in Florida and Tennessee have held that an
individual is not entitled to seek custody of or visitation with the child
57
Such failure
of his or her former partner after the couple separates.
relationparent-like
of
any
continuation
of
possibility
the
eliminates
ships between children and their nonlegal parents, unless the parties
reconcile.58
On the other hand, courts in many states have given weight to the
underlying premises of equitable doctrines, such as in loco parentis,in
situations in which couples, like the same-sex couple discussed above,
dispute the issues of custody and visitation after their relationship
ends. 59 For example, a Pennsylvania court found that a former samesex partner of the biological parent had standing to petition for partial
custody because the partner stood in loco parentis to the child.60 In
addition, a Wisconsin court held that the equitable powers of a court,
which exist apart from the grant of power under the state visitation
statute, may be exercised in awarding visitation to a nonlegal parent
who has "a parent-like relationship with the child" when it is in the
child's best interests. 6 1 Employing similar reasoning, the New Jersey
Supreme Court awarded visitation to a former same-sex partner based
on the in loco parentis relationship that the partner had with the
56. McGuffin v. Overton, 542 N.W.2d 288 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
57. Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); In re Thompson,
11 S.W.3d 913 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).
58. See Dwyer, supra note 2, at 855 (stating that "when the state declines to create a
legal relationship or to give legal protection to a social relationship, a social relationship ...

might cease").

59. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 2.18, at 389-98.
60. J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1319 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). In its discussion of
nonparent standing, the court stated:
The in loco parentis basis for standing recognizes that the need to
guard the family from intrusions by third parties and to protect the
rights of the natural parent must be tempered by the paramount need to
protect the child's best interest .... [W]here the child has established
strong psychological bonds with a person who, although not a biological
parent, has lived with the child and provided care, nurture, and affection, assuming in the child's eye a stature like that of a parent .... our
courts recognize that the child's best interest requires that the third
party be granted standing so as to have the opportunity to litigate fully
the issue of whether that relationship should be maintained even over a
natural parent's objections.

Id.
61. In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995).
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child.62 Furthermore, a Minnesota court upheld a trial court's grant
ofjoint legal custody between a biological parent and her former samesex partner when joint custody was in the child's best interests.63
Other state courts have employed similar analyses in considering
whether to grant parent-like rights to former same-sex partners under
equitable doctrines such as in loco parentis and de facto parenthood.64

B. The In Loco Parentis Doctrine in Nebraska
Under the guidance of Russell's concurring judges, Nebraska
courts should recognize and follow the movement among other states
to use equitable doctrines to provide legal, parent-like rights to individuals who have served as parents to children. In so doing, courts
will be able to respond to the genuine need among families with samesex parents to protect their legal relationships while operating under
a doctrine that is already supported by strong precedent in Nebraska
caselaw-the doctrine of in loco parentis. Furthermore, by applying
the in loco parentis doctrine more freely, courts in Nebraska will be
certain to conduct a thorough examination of all relevant evidence on
a case-by-case basis in order to equitably determine the rights of parties and to provide for the best interests of the children involved in
such cases.
The Nebraska Supreme Court has adopted the following standard
in applying this doctrine:
"[A] person standing in loco parentis to a child is one who has put himself or
herself in the situation of a lawful parent by assuming the obligations incident
to the parental relationship, without going through the formalities necessary
to a legal adoption, and the rights, duties, and liabilitiesof such person are the
same as those of the lawful parent."65

Presumably to ensure that the doctrine will be applied only in worthy
cases, the court has limited its application in several ways. First, the
62. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 555 (N.J. 2000) (stating that "continued regular
visitation is in the twins' best interests because V.C. is their psychological parent"). See also S.F. v. M.D., 751 A.2d 9, 17 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (finding that
a former same-sex partner had standing to petition for visitation based on the
existence of a parent-like relationship, but affirming trial court's denial of visitation based on a determination of the best interests of the child).
63. LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
64. See, e.g., E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999) (holding that Massachusetts courts may grant visitation to de facto parents who have, among other
things, participated in the child's life as a member of the child's family); T.B. v.
L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913, 916 (Pa. 2001) (discussing what constitutes in loco parentis
status).
65. Russell v. Bridgens, 264 Neb. 217, 229, 647 N.W.2d 56, 65 (2002) (Gerrard, J.,
concurring) (emphasis in original) (quoting Weinand v. Weinand, 260 Neb. 146,
152-53, 616 N.W.2d 1, 6 (2000)). See also Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottom, 239
Neb. 579, 592, 477 N.W.2d 8, 17 (1991) (citing Austin v. Austin, 147 Neb. 109,
112-13, 22 N.W.2d 560, 563 (1946)).
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court has emphasized that in order for the doctrine to apply, the individual must be one "who has fully put himself or herself in the situation of a lawful parent by assuming all the obligations incident to the
parental relationship and who actually discharges those obligations." 66 In addition, the court has stated:
The assumption of the parental relationship is largely a question of fact which
should not lightly or hastily be inferred. The parental relationship should be
found to exist only if the facts and circumstances show that the stepparent
means to take the place of the lawful father or mother not only in providing
support but also with reference to the natural parent's office6 7of educating and
instructing and caring for the general welfare of the child.

In keeping with these limitations, the court has refused to extend
the doctrine to an ex-stepparent who "ha[d] neither the legal means
nor the intention of taking the place of the lawful father," when a finding of in loco parentis would have imposed an obligation of child support upon the ex-stepparent. 68 On the other hand, the court has
applied the doctrine of in loco parentis to an ex-stepparent for the purpose of upholding a visitation award when the stepparent lived with
the child for almost eight years. 69 The court noted that "[t]hey referred to each other as father and daughter; there was a close and
loving relationship between them; he was involved in her day-to-day
care, including any necessary discipline; and he took an active interest
in her education and other school activities."70
C.

Toward a Broad and Equitable Application of In Loco
Parentis in Nebraska Courts

Against the foregoing precedential backdrop, the concurring opinion in Russell illustrates how a court in Nebraska may apply an in loco
parentis analysis to the situations of same-sex couples who separate
and subsequently petition to establish custody and support. Beyond
the somewhat narrow facts of Russell, however, the scope of potential
use of in loco parentisfor same-sex couples and their children remains
an unexplored frontier in the exercise of judicial discretion. In addition to providing remedies, such as custody and visitation, to families
like those in Russell who are at the point of separation in their relationship, the question remains whether the doctrine may be developed
66. Russell, 264 Neb. at 230, 647 N.W.2d at 65 (citation omitted); Weinand, 260 Neb.
at 153, 616 N.W.2d at 7 (citing McManus v. Hinney, 151 N.W.2d 44 (Wis. 1967)).
67. Russell, 264 Neb. at 230, 647 N.W.2d at 65 (citing Weinand, 260 Neb. at 154, 616
N.W.2d at 7).
68. Weinand, 260 Neb. at 153, 616 N.W.2d at 7.
69. Hickenbottom, 239 Neb. at 592, 477 N.W.2d at 17.
70. Id. But see In re Destiny S., 263 Neb. 255, 639 N.W.2d 400 (2002) (finding that a
grandmother who served as a foster parent to her grandchild could not intervene
in a juvenile dependency proceeding because she had not attained the status of in
loco parentis at the time of intervention).
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more broadly in order to provide parent-like rights, albeit short of legal adoption, to litigants such as those in In re Adoption of Luke. 7 1
While Luke precludes the possibility of second-parent adoption in
Nebraska absent a relinquishment of rights by the legal parent, 72 the
doctrine of in loco parentis, in conjunction with due analysis of the
best interests of the child, can provide a child with many of the advantages of having a second legal parent while the family is still a cohesive unit.73 At least one court of another state has addressed the
possibility of granting joint custody to a legal and nonlegal parent.
The parties in In re Bonfield74 sought to allocate custody between the
adoptive parent and her same-sex partner out of their concern that
the partner's lack of parental rights would not serve their children's
best interests in the event of the legal parent's death or the couple's
separation. 75 The appellate court, while refusing to allow the samesex partner to petition for "shared parenthood," upheld the Ohio juvenile courts' jurisdiction to determine whether shared custody is in the
best interests of the child.76
In applying the doctrine of in loco parentis to two same-sex parents
who are both seeking to have a legal parental relationship with their
child(ren), Nebraska courts should employ an in-depth, fact-dependent 77 analysis similar to that which is applied in custody determinations after couples separate. The party invoking the doctrine of in loco
parentis should be allowed to present any evidence that tends to show
that he or she "has fully put himself or herself in the situation of a
lawful parent by assuming all the obligations incident to the parental
relationship" and that he or she has "actually discharge[d] those
78
obligations."
One piece of evidence the court may consider in deciding whether a
party "assume[d] all the obligations incident to the parental relation71.

72.
73.

74.
75.
76.
77.

78.

263 Neb. 365, 371, 640 N.W.2d 374, 379 (2002) (per curiam). In general terms,
the litigants in Luke were a same-sex couple attempting to complete a secondparent, or coparent, adoption. They came before the court as an intact family, as
compared to couples who are at the point of separation and seeking to establish
custody or visitation.
Id. at 371, 640 N.W.2d at 379.
See Tiritilli & Koenig, supra note 14, at 12-15 (arguing that legal representatives
of gays and lesbians in Nebraska should advocate for parent-like rights including
custody and visitation under the doctrine of in loco parentis).
780 N.E.2d 241 (Ohio 2002).
Id.
Id. at 244, 249.
See Russell v. Bridgens, 264 Neb. 217, 230, 647 N.W.2d 56, 65 (2002) (Gerrard, J.,
concurring) ("The assumption of the parental relationship is largely a question of
fact which should not lightly or hastily be inferred.") (citing Weinand v. Weinand,
260 Neb. 146, 154, 616 N.W.2d 1, 7 (2000)).
Russell, 264 Neb. at 230, 647 N.W.2d at 65.
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ship" 79 is the completion, or attempted completion, of a second-parent
adoption of the child. Notably, the concurring judges in Russell recognized that the completion of an adoption of the child by the person
invoking the doctrine of in loco parentiswould be "persuasive evidence
supporting the existence" of such a relationship.8 0 However, since the
completion of such a second-parent adoption is not a viable option for
same-sex couples in Nebraska at this time,S1 courts should review
other evidence relevant to the partner's discharging of the obligations
82
of a parent.
Other evidence that Nebraska courts may consider in deciding
whether a party stands in loco parentis to the child includes any statements relating to the party's involvement in the child's life. In Russell, for example, the concurring judges stated that the affidavit that
"describes, in detail, Russell's activities in the role of 'primary care
provider for [the minor child] since [the minor child] was adopted at
age 9 months'" should not have been excluded by the district court,
since it was relevant to the disposition of the case under the doctrine
of in loco parentis.8 3 Certainly, evidence that the partners arranged
together for either the artificial insemination of the biological parent
or the adoption of a child (as was the case for Russell and Bridgens),
planned to raise the child together, and lived together with the child
as a family are all relevant evidence as to whether the nonlegal parent
has established an in loco parentis relationship with the child.84 In
addition, the courts should consider any evidence that the couple executed a coparenting agreement, stating that their parental rights and
duties will continue in the event the couple separates, or any other
79. Id. at 230, 647 N.W.2d at 65.
80. Id. at 230, 647 N.W.2d at 66.
81. See In re Adoption of Luke, 263 Neb. 365, 376, 640 N.W.2d 374, 382-83 (2002)
(per curiam) (holding that "the parents' parental rights must be terminated or
the child must be relinquished in order for the child to be eligible for adoption"
under Nebraska's statutory scheme).
82. See also J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1321 n.4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (stating
that the parties' failure to pursue a second-parent adoption did not "detract[] in
any way from the evidence of the parties' efforts to formalize the relationship
between [the partner] and the child" when the validity of such adoptions was
uncertain in Pennsylvania at the time).
83. Russell, 264 Neb. at 230, 647 N.W.2d at 66 (alteration in original).
84. See J.A.L., 682 A.2d at 1322 (stating that the relevant issue in determining
whether there was an in loco parentisrelationship was whether "parties by their
conduct created a parent-like relationship between [the partner] and the child,"
not the parties' subjective thought processes, doubts, or intentions); In re Custody
of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 435-36 (Wis. 1995) (giving weight to evidence that
the legal parent consented to and fostered a parent-like relationship between the
partner and the child, that the nonlegal parent assumed obligations of
parenthood, and that the length of time the partner spent with the child was
sufficient to establish "a bonded, dependent relationship parental in nature").

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:915

legal documents establishing guardianship or medical consent for the
nonbiological parent.8 5
In Nebraska, the state legislature has provided additional guidance for courts in making custody determinations in general. Thus,
Nebraska courts' determination of whether to allocate custody between same-sex parents should include evidence that shows the parties have fulfilled many of the "parenting functions" outlined in
Nebraska's Parenting Act.8 6 The Act provides:
Parenting functions shall mean those aspects of the parent-child relationship
in which the parent makes fundamental decisions and performs fundamental
functions necessary for the care and development of the minor child. Parenting functions shall include, but not be limited to:
(a) Maintaining a loving, stable, consistent, and nurturing relationship with
the minor child;
(b) Attending to the ongoing needs of the minor child, including feeding,
clothing, physical care and grooming, supervision, and engaging in other
activities appropriate to the healthy development of the minor child
within the social and economic circumstances of the family;
(c) Attending to adequate education for the minor child, including remedial
or other special education essential to the best interests of the minor
child;
(d) Assisting the minor child in maintaining a positive relationship with
both parents and other family members;
(e) Assisting the minor child in developing and maintaining appropriate interpersonal relationships; and
(f) Exercising appropriate support for social, academic, athletic, or other spechild within the social and ecocial interests and abilities of the minor
87
nomic circumstances of the family.

Extending the doctrine of in loco parentisto families with same-sex
parents who seek a legal declaration of shared custody before the
couple reaches the point of separation will not only allow Nebraska
courts to reach more equitable determinations based on in-depth factual inquiries, but it will also aid courts in evaluating whether a grant
of custody or visitation will provide for the child's best interests, a concern which one Supreme Court Justice has referred to as "primary" in
the context of adoption. 8 8 According to one researcher, courts in Nebraska apply an analysis of what is in the best interests of children to
85. See J.A.L., 682 A.2d at 1321-22. The Pennsylvania court noted that the nonlegal
parent's refusal to execute a coparenting agreement would not defeat standing to
petition for custody, since it was uncertain whether such an agreement would be
enforceable under Pennsylvania law. Id. at 1321 n.4.
86. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-2901 to -2919 (Reissue 1998).
87. Id. § 43-2903.
88. See In re Adoption of Luke, 263 Neb. 365, 387, 640 N.W.2d 374, 389-90 (2002)
(Gerrard, J., dissenting) (stating that a consideration of the best interests of children is "what this court has previously held to be the primary interpretive principle applicable to the adoption statutes"); see also Tiritilli & Koenig, supra note 14,
at 17-18 (2002) (arguing that the best interests of the child" should be of paramount concern in custody determinations involving "non-biological, non-adoptive
parents").
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"a number of varying . . .actions involving children from whether a
child should be moved across state lines to whether a minor child's
name should be changed."8 9 In applying a best-interests analysis,
courts must recognize that the benefits enjoyed by children with two
legal parents do not, and should not, exist only when partners separate. The security of financial support, inheritance rights, coverage
under the parents' health insurance, medical consent by both parents,
and visitation rights in the event of separation are among the many
privileges from which children and parents benefit when their relationship is legally recognized. 90 Nebraska courts are able to afford
such equitable outcomes to families with same-sex parents based on
their ability to apply the in loco parentis doctrine to a broad range of
circumstances.
IV.

CONCLUSION

As the concurring opinion in Russell illustrates, courts in Nebraska
should apply the equitable doctrine of in loco parentis to cases involving families with same-sex parents in order to properly provide for the
child's best interests on a case-by-case basis. The need for a broader
application of such equitable doctrines is even greater for those families who, in states such as Nebraska, are currently precluded from establishing the legal protection afforded by marriage and secondparent adoptions. So precluded, families with same-sex parents feel
the adverse effects of parental separation much more deeply than do
other families who benefit from the legal ability to marry and adopt
children. In the worst-case scenario, a nonlegal parent will be permanently forbidden from visiting the child he or she has helped raise,
and the child will suffer a profound and permanent loss as a result.
Despite the lack of legal alternatives for families with same-sex parents, Nebraska courts retain the power to address their needs by
awarding custody and visitation under equitable doctrines such as in
loco parentis. In so doing, courts will enforce the spirit of Nebraska
family law by recognizing parent-child relationships as they currently
exist and by affording the opportunity for such relationships to continue in the future.
Katie A. Fougeron

89. Tiritilli & Koenig, supra note 14, at 17 & n.70 (citing Vogel v. Vogel, 262 Neb.
1030, 637 N.W.2d 611 (2002); In re Change of Name of Andrews, 235 Neb. 170,
454 N.W.2d 488 (1990); Peter v. Peter, 262 Neb. 1017, 637 N.W.2d 865 (2002)).
See also NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-109(1) (Reissue 1998) ("If, upon the hearing, the
court finds that such adoption is for the best interests of such minor child ... , a
decree of adoption shall be entered.").
90. See Palmer, supra note 7, at 9.

